A PR firm can be useful if: – You’re announcing a major funding round (Series A or higher). – You’re entering a highly competitive or consumer-facing market where media buzz directly drives business outcomes. – You have a compelling narrative and a founder/executive team able to deliver it well in interviews. – You’re already experiencing traction and need to amplify a moment, not manufacture one. Even then, PR works best when paired with existing momentum—not as a substitute for product-market fit or customer validation. We, at The Artesian Network have worked with many highly valued great PR firms in the past. We have gotten our clients as featured stories on Bloomberg TV, CNBC Top Disruptive Company Lists, and at the top of headlines on all the tech and business blogs and publications.
But PR Firms are best used at a later stage in the company lifecycle. With resources tight in the early years, you will receive a much greater ROI in other marketing tactics.
🚫 Common Pitfalls of Hiring a PR Firm Early
High cost, low control: Most PR firms charge $8K–$20K/month retainers. That’s a huge chunk of budget for startups with unclear ROI. – No guarantees: Media hits are never guaranteed. You’re paying for effort, not results. – Low relevance: Unless your startup already has a unique, newsworthy hook, reporters often pass on the story. – Misaligned incentives: PR firms optimize for coverage, not customer acquisition.
💡 Smarter Use of Early-Stage Marketing Budget
At the seed or pre-seed stage, founders should prioritize direct, measurable growth activities: – Content marketing (especially founder-led thought leadership on LinkedIn) Paid acquisition tests (Google, LinkedIn, Meta) – SEO for long-tail keywords – Email nurturing and marketing automation – Community building (forums, Discord, Slack) – Webinars or strategic partnerships These channels yield clearer attribution and faster feedback loops.
Strategy for PR Outreach for Early-Stage Startups
📣 Define the Newsworthy Angle
Product launch? – Customer milestone? – Funding announcement? – Major hire or partnership? – Social impact?
📋 Build a Media List
Use tools like: – Muck Rack (https://muckrack.com) – Hunter.io (https://hunter.io) – Manual research via LinkedIn, Twitter, and article bylines Segment by: – Tech journalists – Industry-specific reporters – Local business press – Podcasts/newsletters relevant to your space
✉️ Craft the Press Email (Pitch)
Example Subject Line:
“New AI Tool Helps SMBs Save Hours on Client Research — Interview Ready”
Example Email Body:
1 short sentence of relevance
1–2 sentence summary of your news
Why it matters now
Link to press kit or landing page
Offer exclusive quotes, data, or interviews
🗂️ Prepare a Lightweight Press Kit
Include: – Founder bio and headshot – One-pager about the company – High-res logo and product images – Key metrics or validation (users, customers, revenue milestones) Contact information Host it on a Notion page or Dropbox link.
📤 Pitch Strategically
Personalize each pitch (reference an article or beat they cover) – Use a CRM or spreadsheet to track opens and responses – Follow up once after 3–5 business days
📢 Amplify Any Wins
Share published stories on LinkedIn and Twitter – Add logos of featured publications to your homepage – Mention press in investor or prospect meetings – Repurpose quotes/testimonials in sales and fundraising decks
✍️ Final Recommendation
Unless you’re making a high-stakes, public announcement with broad appeal (e.g., $10M+ Series A, celebrity investor, or product going viral), skip the PR firm and invest in growth tactics with short-term ROI. When the time comes, you can revisit PR—possibly with a part-time contractor or a specialist aligned with your GTM goals.
As someone who has been deep in the trenches of startup life—leading marketing transformations, advising founders, and recovering from a few spectacular crashes—I’ve learned the hard way that due diligence is not just for lawyers and VCs. Whether you’re considering joining a startup, investing in one, or taking it on as a client, these are the top ten red flags I’ve come to recognize. Ignore them at your peril. This isn’t theory. These are patterns I’ve seen play out in real time. Some I caught just in time. Others—like the stories I share in this article on two epic marketing failures—were disasters that could’ve been avoided if someone had asked the right questions sooner.
1. They Say They Have Product-Market Fit, but Can’t Prove It
If they’re claiming rapid growth or “pull from the market,” ask to see renewal rates, customer retention, or even direct references. Often, the early customer base is made up of friends and favors—not actual fit.
2. The Tech Doesn’t Work (Yet They’re Marketing It Anyway)
This one is more common than you’d like to believe. A sexy demo, a polished pitch deck, but no working product. If the “AI” is just a spreadsheet with smoke and mirrors behind it, run.
3. Funding Outpaces Traction
When the raise looks like a Series B but the customer traction looks like pre-seed, you have to wonder: is the company optimizing for PR or solving a real problem?
4. Customer Logos Without Customer Love
Beware the pitch deck adorned with Fortune 500 logos but no case studies, no quotes, and no repeat revenue. This often signals non-repeatable, one-off deals used to signal legitimacy.
5. Over-Polished Branding That Obscures the Truth
A beautiful website and killer pitch videos don’t mean the company is real. One of the worst frauds I saw had the best marketing materials. We found out the customer testimonials were fake.
6. Founders Who Won’t Let Go of the Narrative
If the story never changes—no matter what the data says—they’re more interested in preserving the myth than facing the reality. Dogmatic founders can burn millions chasing the wrong market.
7. No External Validation (or Fear of It)
Healthy startups encourage validation: analyst coverage, independent audits, customer interviews. If they resist external scrutiny, they may be hiding something.
8. The Culture Smells Like Chaos
Ask about turnover, especially in marketing, product, and engineering. A revolving door is often a sign of deeper dysfunction—and a management team in denial. Also, and this has affected me several times in my career, make sure there is diversity of relationships on the board and management team. Too often, I find management teams and the founder’s board made up of people with personally close relationships making it nearly impossible for “outsiders” to affect the trajectory of the company. It’s natural to have some previous relationships existing in the company, but be wary of a closed system or “cabals”.
9. Ethical Flexibility Framed as “Founder Hustle”
Be wary when bending the rules is considered a virtue. I’ve seen founders lie to investors, puff their numbers, or fake compliance “just until we close the round.” Don’t hitch your wagon to that.
10. They Want Advisors but Ignore Advice
If you’re being asked to join as an advisor, investor, or board member, but your counsel is routinely ignored, you’re a prop, not a partner. Get out before you’re blamed for the crash.
Final Thoughts
Startups are risky by design—but not all risks are worth taking. If even two or three of these red flags show up, it’s time to ask harder questions or walk away. Trust your instincts, do the work, and never confuse great storytelling for great execution. I’ve done both. One builds real companies. The other builds illusions.
🔍 Bonus: Due Diligence Checklist
Want a 1-page checklist version of this article to use in your next deal or job interview? DM me or leave a comment below, and I’ll send it to you.
Principal consultant Jonathan Buckley just had a piece published in the CXO Dispatch about getting early-stage technology companies to market with reduced risk. It includes a video interview.
AI is no longer a novelty in B2B tech marketing—it’s a competitive necessity. But while many marketers are exploring how generative AI can save time, fewer are using it to actually improve the quality of their positioning and messaging. At The Artesian Network, we’ve been launching and scaling AI-driven companies since 2017, well before ChatGPT introduced the broader market to what was possible. What we’ve found is that the power of AI in marketing isn’t about replacing expertise—it’s about multiplying it. When used well, AI helps experienced marketers move faster, test more ideas, and spot value gaps that human teams often miss. Here are ten best practices we use to get the most out of AI for B2B messaging and positioning:
1. Start with a Value-Claims Analysis Table
Before you write a single line of copy, use AI to map your product’s value claims against those of key competitors or substitutes. At The Artesian Network, we start this process by instructing the AI to summarize the marketing claims from competing product pages into a condensed list of recurring value statements—phrases like “faster onboarding,” “low-code customization,” or “seamless integrations.” To do this effectively, we: – Feed the AI the exact URLs of competitor websites—especially their product, solutions, and use case pages. – Instruct it to extract and normalize claims into consistent language. – Ask it to count how many times each claim appears on each competitor’s site to gauge emphasis and repetition. This process produces a value-claims matrix showing which claims are ubiquitous (table stakes), overused (hard to differentiate), and which are clear gaps your product can credibly own. But here’s the key: We always consolidate down to just 4–5 focused value claims for your product. These should be the claims your messaging consistently reinforces—across site copy, decks, demos, and outbound. Why? Because spread too thin, your positioning becomes noise. Concentrated, it becomes power. And it goes without saying: you must actually deliver on the claims you make. The most dangerous positioning mistake is to promise what the product doesn’t support—because that’s not positioning, that’s just brand erosion in disguise.
Value-Claims Analysis Output
2. Prime AI with a Fully-Formed Contextual Folder
Think of your AI as a junior strategist—it only performs well when it’s given a complete context pack: – ICP and buyer persona breakdowns – Buyer committee roles (typically 6–7 stakeholders in enterprise sales) – Competitive collateral and positioning – Industry-specific language and macro/microeconomic conditions – Pricing dynamics (commodity, premium, or disruptive) – Funding paths (which budget line the purchase comes from) Without this structure, outputs will always lack depth.
3. Clarify the Type of Sale
AI needs to know if you’re competing on price, features, ecosystem, or disruption. For instance: – A commodity sale competes on cost and utility. – A disruptive sale might draw funds from innovation or transformation budgets. That distinction radically changes how you frame benefits, urgency, and objections.
4. Define the Desired Messaging Tone and Voice Upfront
The best results come when you establish whether the voice should be authoritative, optimistic, provocative, or humble. AI excels at adaptation—but only when you’ve specified your brand’s persona clearly.
5. Use AI to Generate Hypotheses—Then Pressure-Test Them with Sales
Let AI rapidly propose alternative ways of expressing your value prop. Then run those through your sales team or revenue leaders. Often, the best ideas don’t come from a boardroom—they come from a rep’s inbox.
6. Train AI to Recognize Vertical-Specific Language and Pain Points
Generic messaging kills enterprise momentum. Load the AI with case studies, call transcripts, and customer quotes specific to your vertical. This primes it to speak the buyer’s language—without sounding robotic or detached.
7. Generate Variant Messaging for Each Buyer Committee Role
Your economic buyer, technical evaluator, and frontline user all care about different things. Use AI to tailor benefits for each: – CTOs care about scalability and integrations. – Operations leaders want faster workflows. – CFOs focus on ROI, not features. AI can handle that personalization at scale—if you feed it role-specific prompts.
8. Map Messaging to the Buying Journey
AI can accelerate the creation of nurture sequences, but only if you map messaging to awareness, consideration, and decision stages. Use AI to test which content themes move leads downstream fastest.
A Typical Enterprise Customer Journey Map
9. Avoid Over-Reliance on Prompt Templates—Invest in Prompt Craft
The best outcomes don’t come from prompt libraries—they come from experienced prompt engineers who understand marketing strategy. AI is only as strong as the marketer guiding it. You wouldn’t give a Ferrari to a student driver. Same rules apply here.
10. Continuously Refresh Competitive Inputs and Market Signals
Your AI models and prompt structures should evolve with your market. Refresh inputs monthly or quarterly: – New product launches – Pricing shifts – Analyst reports – Buyer objections from sales calls This ensures your messaging doesn’t go stale—and your positioning stays ahead.
Final Thought
AI doesn’t replace your positioning strategy. It reveals the gaps, accelerates the iterations, and makes it easier to go to market with confidence. But only if it’s used by people who know what they’re doing. At The Artesian Network, we build that process into every GTM engagement. Because the future of B2B marketing belongs to those who can see the signal in the noise—and move fast on it.
How We’re Seeing 5x Productivity Gains—But Only When Senior Minds Steer the Machines
The AI hype is deafening. It seems like every week a new tool promises to eliminate your marketing team, write your next viral campaign, or unlock secrets from your data. But here’s the hard truth we’ve discovered at The Artesian Network: AI only works when the person behind the keyboard knows exactly what they’re doing. Only 6% of Gen X professionals are even moderately well-versed in AI, and most of that expertise is limited to basic content generation. For all the power AI tools now hold, they are still just that—tools. Without a skilled strategist guiding the work, they generate output, not outcomes.
The AI Myth: Faster ≠ Smarter
Yes, AI allows junior marketers to “do the things of marketing” faster—generate emails, draft blogs, spin up taglines. But speed alone is meaningless if you’re doing the wrong things, or doing the right things in the wrong way. At The Artesian Network, our process starts long before we prompt an AI engine. We first prime the machine with: – A precisely defined ICP (Ideal Customer Profile) – Market tone and audience nuances – SEO context and competitive language – Technology features mapped to differentiated benefits – A phased, long-term content strategy This is not a junior task. It’s the domain of senior professionals with experience across industries and GTM functions. The art of good prompting is built on the foundation of good marketing. And that can’t be rushed.
Real Numbers: 5x Leverage in Strategic Execution
We’re now seeing a 5 to 1 productivity gain in our engagements thanks to AI. But it’s not just about speed—it’s about scope and precision. We currently use 14 different AI platforms for tasks like: – Value-claims analysis against market competitors and substitutes – Pricing optimization and elasticity modeling – Branding concept development – Website wireframing and layout – Image creation and visual storytelling – SEO analysis and performance optimization – Content generation across formats – Print and collateral layout automation And we don’t just use these tools ourselves—we audit our clients’ AI-readiness, recommend tools tailored to their workflows, and implement AI systems that allow them to scale intelligently after we’re gone.
What’s Next: Personalized Messaging Without the SDR Bottleneck
One of the most exciting AI advances we’re testing this quarter is automated personalization at scale. Imagine: – Dynamic message generation based on prospect-specific firmographics – Consistent brand tone and adherence without manual review – No more dependency on junior SDRs to execute personalization at volume This is the holy grail of outbound marketing—automated precision without losing nuance. And the tech is finally catching up to the dream.
AI Is Ready. Are You?
The promise of AI isn’t theoretical anymore. But the real leverage comes from pairing it with experience. You can’t hand a scalpel to an intern and expect surgery. You can’t hand GPT-4 to a junior marketer and expect a breakthrough campaign. At The Artesian Network, we believe in human-led, AI-powered marketing—where the operator knows what to build, what to ask, and what to ignore. Because in the end, it’s not the tool that wins the race. It’s the one who knows how to wield it.
Want to Learn More? Start with These Guides
For those looking to deepen their understanding of how to integrate AI into effective marketing, we highly recommend the practical resources available at www.mindstream.news. One image was created and shared by Will McTighe.
These are quick, practical reads that reflect the philosophy we follow at The Artesian Network: AI is a force multiplier—but only when paired with human judgment and domain expertise.
Why early-stage B2B tech startups need experienced, technical, senior marketing teams—and how to find the right one
Let’s be honest: most startup founders don’t trust marketers. And with good reason.
In the B2B tech world, we’ve seen a familiar pattern repeat itself—over and over. It usually starts with an incredible technical insight: a founder (or founding team) builds something genuinely novel. There’s a real gap in the market, and the early product makes a few smart people sit up and take notice.
But then comes the realization: you need to tell the story, not just build the system.
Why Founders Get Burned by Marketing
Many technical founders view marketing with a mix of suspicion and disappointment. They’ve either hired marketers who couldn’t grasp the product—or they’ve heard horror stories from friends who did.
This disconnect is almost inevitable. Too few marketers can “speak tech.” They mistake features for benefits, miss the architectural brilliance under the hood, or fail to translate a powerful capability into a message the market can actually understand.
It’s no surprise that many founders keep marketing at arm’s length. In fact, some are outright hostile to it.Let’s be honest: most startup founders don’t trust marketers. And with good reason.
In the B2B tech world, we’ve seen a familiar pattern repeat itself—over and over. It usually starts with an incredible technical insight: a founder (or founding team) builds something genuinely novel. There’s a real gap in the market, and the early product makes a few smart people sit up and take notice.
But then comes the realization: you need to tell the story, not just build the system.
That’s when the friction starts.
The burn cycle
They’ve seen the polished decks, the vague slogans, the cookie-cutter playbooks that ignore product nuance. They’ve seen form without function.
The Marketplace of Marketing Help is Siloed—and That’s a Trap Most of the marketing help available to startups is fragmented. You get:
Each offers a slice of the puzzle, but few are able to pull the full picture together. More often than not, they aren’t aligned with outcomes—they’re aligned with outputs. Blog posts. Pitch decks. Ad campaigns. Funnels. Metrics.
But early-stage startups need something much more foundational: go-to-market strategy rooted in reality, driven by insight, and delivered with speed.
The “Pyramid Problem” in Marketing Consulting Even when founders do engage outside help, there’s another common pitfall: the pyramid model.
You meet with a senior partner who seems credible—maybe even great. But once the deal is done, the work gets handed down to junior staffers. People who’ve never launched a company, never sat in a board meeting, never felt the existential pressure of a cash runway and a market that’s not quite biting.
These junior consultants often lack the pattern recognition that only comes from cycles of failure and success across dozens of startups. They may be smart. They may be eager. But they’re not ready to call the shots.
Startups don’t have the luxury to wait for someone to learn the ropes on the job.
When Founders Try to Hire In-House…
It Gets Risky Fast. So maybe you decide to build your own marketing team.
It sounds good on paper: hire a full-time VP of Marketing and let them build from there. But here’s what happens far too often:
You hire someone from a large company—a mid-level manager, maybe a director—and up-title them to VP or CMO. But their experience is shaped by a world that’s very different from yours.
In big companies, marketers are highly specialized—not generalists.
They’re focused on efficiency, not efficacy.
They’re trained to optimize existing systems, not create new ones from scratch.
Big Company Marketers Versus Those Optimized for Startups
Early-stage companies need the opposite. They need people who can navigate ambiguity, test hypotheses, iterate fast, and work across functions—not within a silo.
No wonder the average tenure of a startup CMO is under 18 months. The mismatch isn’t about intelligence—it’s about context.
The Time Trap: Why Startups Can’t Afford to Assemble a Team Slowly
Even if you’re determined to build the “perfect” team, you’ll face another brutal constraint: time.
Let’s break it down:
2–3 months to hire a VP
Another 1–2 months per discipline (content, demand gen, ops, design)
Weeks or months for onboarding and team chemistry
And that’s before you’ve produced anything of value.
The Timeline For A Full-time Marketing Team is Too Long
Speed is the only real advantage most startups have in the early years. You cannot squander it building infrastructure. You need traction. Fast.
Why Full-Time May Not Even Be Necessary
Here’s the kicker: most early-stage companies don’t need a full-time marketing team.
What they do need is a cross-functional senior team who can jump in immediately, drive strategy, deliver execution, and stay aligned to business outcomes—not just marketing metrics.
You need one part business consultant, one part execution partner. Not a loose federation of vendors. Not a junior team that needs mentoring.
You need a co-pilot.
What to Look for in a Fractional Marketing Partner If you’re ready to go the fractional route, don’t just look for an agency or an outsourced “stack.” Look for a team that:
Has deep operator experience—they’ve sat in your chair
Can “speak tech” and act as a translation layer between engineering and market
Brings product management insight, not just product marketing polish
Offers true cross-functional capability, from strategy to execution
Delivers one senior point of accountability—not a rotating cast
Follows a proven framework like Build It. Test It. Prove It.
And above all, make sure they know how to identify—and call out—a lack of product-market fit. It’s better to hear it early than fund a flawed GTM strategy.
The Artesian Network: Built for This Moment
At The Artesian Network, we’ve been that partner—for over 15 years.
We’ve supported dozens and dozens of early-stage tech companies across Silicon Valley, the broader U.S., Europe, and the Middle East. And the results speak for themselves:
The Artesian Network Has Serviced Clients Across The Globe
Over 50% have gone on to a successful IPO or acquisition
The others? Nearly all have raised successive rounds and achieved real traction.
In the rare cases where failure occurred, it was not without our early signal that product-market fit had not been achieved as outlined in two case studies we have outlined in previous LinkedIn Articles.
We don’t just “do marketing. “We help startups move faster, execute smarter, and build companies that scale.
Final Thought: This Isn’t Just Marketing. This Is Survival.
Marketing isn’t a department. It’s how the market comes to understand your value.
You can’t afford to get it wrong. You can’t afford to go slow. And you certainly can’t afford to bet your trajectory on junior talent and fragmented tactics.
If you’re ready to move faster—and smarter—bring in a team that understands the whole game. Marketing, product, growth, strategy—all in one.
Because the right fractional team isn’t a cost. It’s a multiplier.
In the mid-1990s, the internet was a spark lighting up the world, and I stood at the center of its ignition.
At Pacific Telesis—the venerable West Coast telecom holding company for Pacific Bell—I was charged with managing the physical infrastructure for its emerging high-tech ventures: mobile phones, wireless cable, a state-wide fiber backbone, and finally a network-based voicemail system. As Director of Real Estate and Facilities, I was building data centers, Points of Presence (PoPs), call centers, and storefronts as fast as our engineers could design them. What began with two facilities ballooned into hundreds.
Environmental stability was paramount. Network uptime had to be near perfect. Our engineers had monitoring tools—SNMP traps and remote network management platforms—but alerts often came too late. Over 70% of system outages began in my domain: power, cooling, fire suppression, humidity. I remember roaming equipment rooms late at night, listening for alarms and scanning for blinking red lights. For a while, before I was allowed to hire staff, I was the facility manager myself.
It was during this time that a contractor I worked with, Steve Hunter, and I imagined something audacious over lunch: what if we could connect every piece of environmental equipment to the internet and monitor it all with a simple web browser?
At the time, most of this equipment came with intelligent serial ports—used by technicians on service calls. If we could decode the proprietary protocols and convert serial data into IP traffic, we could build something groundbreaking.
Steve began developing a crude prototype. I bought two units. They worked well enough to start scaling back my 24/7 roaming staff. The idea had legs.
Chapter 1: The Spark
Two years later, I was working in business strategy for a Big Four firm, designing global expansion strategies for tech companies in Silicon Valley. One day, Steve visited me in San Francisco. He had refined the prototype—now ready for broader deployment. He floated the idea: leave the firm, join him, and turn this into a real company.
The internet boom was pumping. San Francisco pulsed with energy—launch parties, new logos on SoMa warehouses, VC-funded dreams flying fast and loose. I was comfortable, but not immune to the fever.
I jumped. We formed NetBrowser Communications with a bank account containing $18,000, a demo unit, and a dream. I became the COO, head of sales, and corporate secretary. We hired Marc Davilla, a super capable sales engineer, and went to work. We built a crude website, crafted data sheets, refined our live demo, and hit the phones. Sales came quickly.
NetBrowser’s website circa 2000
We signed on Pacific Bell, Delta Dental, and a wave of CLECs (Competitive Local Exchange Carriers). We joined Salesforce in their first 1,000 customers to manage our growing pipeline. As the orders grew, we brought in our first head of engineering—Dr. Ujwal Setlur, a brilliant coder.
Money, inevitably, became the constraint. We needed capital to grow.
Chapter 2: The First Fall
Our first major outside investment came from an early Apple product manager, backed by French capital. The deal—literally signed on a napkin in NetBrowser’s conference room —brought in $2 million. I was to hire a full-time head of sales and jump-start marketing and business development.
We moved into a real office.
Like so many Valley startups, the space reflected the times: open floor plans, bean bag chairs, a pool table, ping-pong table, stocked fridge with unlimited snacks and drinks. The energy was electric. We worked late. We laughed. We built.
Then it all cracked.
One morning around 11 a.m., Steve walked into the office and dropped a bombshell.
He told us he had a “talk with God in the shower,” and that God had told him four things:
“His life moving forward as CEO would be prioritized as God, family, and then business—and that business could only take up 20 hours per week max.”
“NetBrowser was to adopt a Christian mission and vision statement, and I, as the COO, would need to distribute the new materials to our team—Muslim, Hindu, Atheist, and Catholic alike.”
“We would begin daily noontime Bible study as a company.”
Also, I was told he had received a vision that our newest and top-performing sales hire was actually the Devil, sent to sabotage the company—and that it was my job to fire him.
I was relatively early in my executive career, but no business school, leadership book, or mentorship experience had prepared me for this. And it didn’t stop there. The workplace began to take on an almost surreal tone. I started recording conversations just to play them back for an outside business coach—to confirm that I wasn’t losing my mind.
We were entering serious legal territory. You can’t fire someone based on religious visions. You can’t mandate religious practices at work. On top of that, business was thriving and every one of us was already stretched thin. We simply didn’t have time for this.
Unless Steve could silence his faith in the workplace and find a way to quadruple his hours, we were going to lose everything.
I called our new chairman and lead investor. He was boarding a plane to Paris when I reached him. I kept my voice calm and steady as I described what had transpired. At the end of the call, I simply said: “We need help. Fast.”
Within two weeks, Steve agreed to sell a sizable portion of his shares to the VC and step away from the business. A new CEO would be brought in immediately.
Chapter 3: The Ascent
Mike, a former lineman for the phone company who had risen through the ranks to lead major teams, was someone I knew from my Pacific Bell days. He wasn’t formally schooled in business—he didn’t even have a college degree—but he was grounded, technically competent, and he knew how to manage. More importantly, he wasn’t divisive. The Chairman believed he was exactly what we needed to reset the culture and stabilize the operation.
Under Mike’s leadership, NetBrowser matured rapidly. We hired up and scaled quickly growing to over 40 people. The team included engineers, client services staff, support reps, marketing help, and a growing install team. Our customer list kept expanding: EMC, WorldCom, SBC, Exodus Communications, Gillette, and a host of data center operators and CLECs. The technology was evolving in real time, and the deals were getting bigger. It felt like the company was finally becoming what we had imagined.
And we were. Ujwal and his engineering team were producing magic. The technology stack was robust and flexible, and we had begun prototyping what would later be understood as embedded agents—software that could reside directly on environmental infrastructure and report back in real time.
But scaling meant burn. And one day, Mike pulled me into a side room and delivered the news:
“We’ve got about a month of cash left. After that, we miss payroll.”
It was an existential moment. We had finally built a real company—and now we were about to run out of money.
We had been on the fundraising trail for months—reaching out to what felt like a hundred venture firms. About twenty had taken meetings. We pitched relentlessly, refining the message each time, adjusting for feedback, chasing leads that led nowhere. The effort was grueling. Eventually, Mike burned out. He had emotionally checked out of the roadshow process altogether.
But Ujwal and I couldn’t quit. We rewrote the pitch in our own voice—grounded in data and facts, told with passion. We emphasized the strength of the product, the real traction we had with enterprise customers, and the vision that drove us to build it all in the first place.
Then came our shot.
Chapter 4: The Pitch of a Lifetime
Then, a miracle: the venerable Sequoia Capital said yes to a meeting.
Sequoia Capital offices on Sandhill Road
And not just anyone a Sequoia said yes—Mike Moritz himself said yes. By then, Moritz was already legendary. His internet company investments included Google, Yahoo!, PayPal, Webvan, YouTube, eToys, and Zappos. Alongside him sat Pierre Lamond, another titan of Silicon Valley. Lamond had been behind investments in Vitesse Semiconductor, Redback Networks, and Plumtree, and had helped shape National Semiconductor into an industry force. The two partners were accompanied by a couple of sharp analysts, note pads ready.
Mike Moritz, Sequoia Capital Partner
We gave it everything in the first pitch. Moritz was engaged, leaning in, asking questions. Lamond was more measured but clearly intrigued. The technology landed. The customer traction landed. They saw potential. We walked out of that first meeting buzzing.
A second meeting was scheduled for the following Monday— “deal day,” as we called it. Back at HQ, though, things were dire. Accounts receivables were stalling. Cash was dangerously low. We had already laid off staff. If Sequoia passed, we might not survive.
The second meeting went deep: product architecture, customer use cases, sales funnel strategy. Moritz was probing but encouraging. But at the end, he noted: “It would help to have the CEO present.”
We scheduled the third and final meeting. This one was it. We knew the full partnership would be there. Mike, our CEO, was required.
Ujwal and I rehearsed obsessively. We had the flow down cold. The product narrative. The origin story. The tech architecture. Customer logos and proof points. We were ready.
Mike declined rehearsals. “I know the business,” he said. “I’ll be ready.”
We arrived early at Sequoia’s Sand Hill Road offices. The conference room was classic Sequoia—minimal but elegant, precise, focused. Every partner in the firm sat at the long table.
Mike was nowhere.
Ujwal and I exchanged glances. We were horrified, but the show had to go on. After five tense minutes, Moritz signaled us to begin.
We launched in—just like we practiced. It flowed. The story was tight. The technology was visionary. We wove in endorsements from big-name clients. Momentum was building.
Then the doors opened.
Mike entered, sweaty and breathless. “Traffic,” he mumbled. He took the floor. His commentary was… fine. Off-script, but solid. It was survivable.
Then came the final question from Moritz.
“We always close with one question,” he said. “When you get the money, what are you going to do next?”
Mike paused. One beat. Two.
Then: “We are gonna just ROCK!”
The energy in the room evaporated. Polite smiles. Quiet nods. We were dismissed.
The next morning, the dreaded call came. Mike, barely holding it together, delivered the news:
Sequoia passed.
Chapter 5: Burning Down the Clock
After the Sequoia rejection, silence fell across the office. I remember sitting in the corner office with Mike, the blinds half drawn to block out the unforgiving Bay Area sun. Neither of us said much. The weight of it hung in the air.
Then Mike leaned back in his chair, closed his eyes, and said quietly, “We’re going to miss payroll.”
It was happening. We still had customers. We still had a revolutionary product. But we were out of time. Accounts receivables were locked up in a cascading financial panic as the dot-com world started wobbling. We couldn’t wait for payments. We couldn’t count on miracles.
Enter Ed—our primary investor. Ed was a grizzled veteran of financial street fights. He wasn’t betting on us out of sentiment. He saw a valuable piece of IP that didn’t deserve to be buried in the wreckage of a failed startup. He wired in a $2 million bridge loan—just enough for maybe eight more weeks of life.
With that slim window, Ujwal and I went back into the trenches.
That’s when we were introduced to a small company based in the Midwest. They had been building a complementary analytics layer and claimed to have caught the attention of Venrock—the venture arm of the Rockefeller family and behind such technology greats as Intel and Apple and so many more brand names. The pitch was simple: combine their analytics with our infrastructure platform and we’d have a more compelling, end-to-end story.
We were skeptical, but desperate. We worked closely with them to craft a merged vision. The pitch we produced was clean, honest, urgent. We hit send.
And then the improbable happened.
Venrock responded.
The partner assigned to the deal had once worked as a senior consultant at Arthur Andersen—the very same firm where I had cut my teeth years earlier. We shared war stories. The analyst on the deal knew one of my close friends. The human connections clicked.
Pitch one: green light.
Pitch two: nailed.
Pitch three: scheduled.
But then came the condition.
Venrock wanted a new CEO. Not just any CEO—but someone from IBM. A proven executive. A seasoned operator. Someone they trusted.
We swallowed hard. Mike saw the writing on the wall and stepped aside—reluctantly, but with grace. Ujwal and I knew this was our only path forward. We had to play along.
The third pitch was presented with the new IBM executive front and center. He had the look, the pedigree, the polish.
And just days later, we got the call: Venrock was in. They would lead the round. iMinds Ventures in San Francisco would co-invest. We had a real board now, with a serious independent director—Mike McCloskey, former CEO of Genesys and Kana Software.
The due diligence was deep and exhausting, but we passed. The green light was given.
The company was saved.
Chapter 6: The Deal
Everything was moving. The due diligence process was deep, detailed, and relentless—but we passed. The term sheet from Venrock was in hand. It was real. It was happening.
And then, on the morning of September 11, 2001, the world stopped.
I had flown into Raleigh-Durham, arriving at 1:00 a.m. to present NetBrowser at the Uptime Institute’s Disaster Recovery Conference. It was surreal timing. By breakfast, I was mid-speech when the first pager buzzed. Then another. Then another. A gasp echoed through the room— “Oh my God!”
Someone made the announcement: a plane had hit the World Trade Center. The conference ended instantly. I was stranded with other attendees, most from major banks and financial institutions tied to New York. I watched, live, as the second plane struck.
Calls started coming in.
After some hours, I knew friends were missing. My wife and I had built a network of friends in finance over the years—many from her time in investment banking. We had attended countless industry weekends in places like Pebble Beach with the Securities Industry Association. It felt impossible that any of them could be gone.
Just three weeks earlier, we had dinner with Paul Sloan, my wife’s young trading desk assistant from San Francisco. He was off to live his dream on a New York trading desk. He’d taken a job on the 82nd floor of the South Tower at the World Trade Buildings.
Paul was on the phone with his father in Marin County, deciding whether he should leave after the first plane hit. He chose to stay. Eventually the call went dead as the fire rages below. The South Tower was the first hit and the first to collapse. To this day, that was the only funeral I’ve ever attended without a body.
In total, six people in our immediate network were killed—some in the towers, one on the plane that hit the Pentagon, and another in the field in Pennsylvania. I would later learn that the husband of one of our business contacts from APC, a company we worked closely with, was among the dead.
I was stranded for a week on the East Coast before returning home to my wife and our newborn child. But NetBrowser still had to go on.
Thankfully, none of our team in New York was lost. Everyone had been accounted for.
The fate of the Venrock deal hung in suspension. The financial world was reeling. Planes were grounded. Markets were closed. It seemed like everything might collapse.
And yet, two weeks after the attacks, the deal closed.
We raised $12 million.
At a time when no one was funding anything, we were the only startup in Silicon Valley to close a round in Q4 of 2001.
It was unprecedented. It was unbelievable.
It was our last-second escape.
Chapter 7: The Infiltration
But what arrived after the wire transfer wasn’t celebration. It was infiltration.
Some very strange characters started showing up—people we hadn’t hired, hadn’t vetted, and couldn’t control. First came Peter—a man who, to this day, calls himself a co-founder of NetBrowser, though he was not. He took the title of CTO and quickly assembled his own clique. Then came Chad—a charming but erratic salesman with a sociopathic edge. They moved in like a pack.
It didn’t take long to realize they didn’t want us there. Not me. Not Ujwal. Not anyone from the original NetBrowser team.
The camaraderie we’d built over years of shared struggle vanished overnight. In its place: turf wars, gossip, and intimidation. What was once a tense, but bonded startup had become something else entirely—a company of gangs.
One afternoon, I was in my office working on slides for a board meeting when Chad and Peter walked in, uninvited. Chad leaned in, grinning, and said:
“I practiced with my Desert Eagle (a .50-caliber handgun) this weekend. I used a picture of your face for the target. I’m accurate.”
I didn’t respond. I couldn’t. The air in the room had turned leaden.
Another time, outside the office where Peter and his gang took their ritual smoke breaks, he turned to me and said, loud enough for everyone to hear:
“If you don’t fall in line, I’m going to put your mouth on the curb and kick the back of your head.”
They all laughed. I didn’t.
I didn’t know how to operate in this environment.
And yet—I stayed. Too long. I still believed in the product. I had invested years of my life. And we had just survived the crucible of financing. I didn’t want to walk away.
Then came the setups.
Someone told the CFO I kept a bottle of bourbon in my desk. I didn’t.
The new VP of Business Development told the CEO—someone I considered trusted—that I had lit a bag of dog poop on fire on his front porch. He said he saw me do it. I hadn’t. I never would.
But the lies spread like smoke. And the smoke choked the company.
Meanwhile, all the deals Chad supposedly had in the pipeline—military contracts, partnerships that required lavish “entertainment” trips to Tijuana—failed to materialize. While they chased illusions, the real NetBrowser sales pipeline began to wither. The product was no longer the focus. Image had replaced integrity.
I stopped sleeping. My health declined. At home, I had a newborn. At work, I had a war zone.
And then one day, the CEO asked for a meeting. I walked in, knowing it was over.
I was pushed out painfully. Ujwal held on a little longer. It felt personal with all the drama that had preceded, but it eventually became clear that this was a cost move to reduce burn—and I was near the top of the payroll.
But we both knew it was over.
Epilogue: The Echo
NetBrowser limped along for a while after our departure. The core platform faded. But like the roots of a tree cut down too soon, our work continued to spread underground.
In 2003, NetBrowser was sold to a strategic investor. The name disappeared and was replaced by Modius. But the technology we built lived on—and that matters to people who love creating products the way we did.
Ujwal went on to build a real-time, nationwide biosensor monitoring platform for the U.S. government, using the same core architecture we had pioneered at NetBrowser. The embedded agent we had designed to live on so-called “dumb” machines? That concept evolved into what the world now knows as the Internet of Things.
The real-time, distributed database architecture we built years before it had a name would go on to precede what the tech world eventually called Big Data. Big Data became a market worth hundreds of billions of dollars and changed the nature of computing forever.
We were early. We were right. But we were just a few years too soon.
As for me, I went on to lead other companies—some of which went public, some were acquired, and some didn’t make it. But none of them ever matched the raw belief, the relentless energy, or the sheer audacity we had at NetBrowser. That wild certainty that we were building something the world would one day need.
And we were.
The company just didn’t live long enough to see it.
But ask any of us—Ujwal, Marc, the engineers, the original team who toiled through the nights—and we’ll all say the same thing:
We did rock.
And we’d do it all over again.
I have written this story with all the love, the passion, the lessons for the former startup crew at NetBrower. I do hope we somehow, somewhere may rock together again. ✌️🫶🤟
A dramatic story of building a company with all the drama, intrigue, wins, losses and murder
It was 2007 and cloud computing was in its relative infancy. Salesforce had launched just eight years prior and was starting to gain considerable traction. Former colleague, Patrick Harr and his former college roommate Geoff Tudor had an idea to transform a former free consumer facing file storage company into an enterprise cloud storage company.
Streamload, founded in 1998 in San Diego, California by Steve Iverson, a student at Pomona College, was one of the first Internet storage services, receiving various accolades for products between 2002 and 2006. The company attracted angel investor and computer software entrepreneur Charlie Jackson and $1.2 million in investment by August 2004.
Streamload’s flagship product was renamed to MediaMax and spun off on July 1, 2007, with the existing company being renamed to Nirvanix. Patrick Harr and Geoff Tudor wanted to pursue the storage service market for enterprise customers. A new Nirvanix system, called the Storage Delivery Network, was built with new software and hardware systems. Nirvanix incorporated both the lessons-learned operating a large-scale online storage service under Streamload as well as techniques in clustering, virtualization, database-driven file system architectures and distributed networking. Nirvanix filed nine patents on this new platform in August 2007. It announced its Nirvanix Storage Delivery Network in September 2007, comparing it to the Amazon Simple Storage Service.
An Early Snapshot of Nivanix’s “Storage Delivery Network”
With the platform now mostly repurposed and a future launch in its sights, in mid-2007 I got a call from Patrick Harr, the new CEO. He wanted to discuss the possibility of joining the company in San Diego as the Chief Marketing Officer (CMO) in time to launch the company as an enterprise storage company in the Fall. The appeal of working with my former colleagues on one of first cloud projects was too hard to pass up. It was clear to me at this point now that cloud was the way computing and storage was moving. I wanted to be on the bleeding edge.
Nirvanix logo. (PRNewsFoto/Nirvanix)
In the pitch, Patrick explained that they had a distributed set of storage centers, each with a continuous backup of data in case of disaster. As CDN made sure that media files (large) could be automatically balanced across the Internet for optimization of interaction speed. All the elements were in place.
I signed the deal and set my starting date.
A week passed, while a month before my start date, and I was invited to an emergency call by the Nirvanix team. A wildfire was sweeping across the fields around San Diego and it was within a quarter mile of a Nirvanix data location and moving toward it.
“Well, redistribute the data to another node on the network and out of harms way. Problem solved, the rest is for the insurance company.” I said.
There was an awkward pause on the phone from everyone on the team. Apparently, I was the only one who didn’t know the truth behind the vision. Nirvanix only had one data center though it INTENDED to open five more and it was in the direct path of the fire. To make matters worse, the week prior, Patrick had cancelled the backup services to the site to save costs. My new company was within an hour of failing before it even launched.
Suddenly, the winds shifted, pushing the fires to the north of the data center, saving the business, our launch plans and dreams.
I had joined a month before launch. So much needed to be done. Hiring a PR firm, building out demand gen systems, locking down on messaging etc. I started at the company with one marketing manager and three unpaid interns. Things were run very lean. We locked on the name for the product almost immediately: “The Storage Delivery Network” (SDN) and we were going to refer to what we were doing as “cloud storage” even though that naming convention was nascent in the market. We saw it as not only accurate, but forward thinking, and that it would climb to en vogue.
Our bets were right. The interaction with Press and Analysts around the launch allowed us to expose the virtues of cloud computing and storage. A new utility was born.
The Cover of Nirvanix’s Original Corporate Deck
Edgard Capdeville, who Patrick and I had worked with in a prior company, and coincidently once part of venture capital firm that funded my first startup, NetBrowser Communications, stepped in to be VP of Product. He developed an innovative and precent developer platform for the business. Edgard would later turn to Business Development to onboard CDNs to the platform.
Nivanix’s Orginal Developer Program
In preparation of pushing into the enterprise space, we developed an appliance to sit on the customers site to act as a filer cache, something we branded CloudNAS. It was to become a pivotal component of our offering.
We built a robust developer program with APIs, materials and support personnel to attract developers to begin coding the SDN into their products. Within the year we would have over 600 developers creating products and interconnects with our platform.
One of the first developers in built a file storage solution within Facebook and his service was taking off. Media companies and CDNs were building apps with the SDN imbedded. But this wasn’t enterprise storage.
In the background, Nivanix wad receiving weekly visits from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the free storage side of the legacy business had been linked to the storage and serving of huge stashes of child porn and other illicit information. As the service was free and anonymous, it was subject to considerable abuse, but this was the business we were transitioning from.
Patrick and Geoff then brought in a hotshot enterprise sales VP named Dan Havens from Seattle to kickoff a true enterprise sales play. They drove sales hard. General Electric (GE) was the first enterprise client to fall. Then came The Planet, Nero, CDNetwork and many more.
That launch year we received “Top 10 Storage Company” in the rags and many other accolades followed including “Startup of the Year”. We were a dream team so much of the press wanted to interview.
Within a few months, a large technology company floated an unsolicited bid to buy the company at nearly 10X the invested capital. The board turned it down flatly. This was going to be a $1B+ company, and fast, they thought.
In the back of the minds of the senior team, however, was the looming threat of the ever-emerging Amazon Web Services. Amazon had the financial ability to drive the cost of storage toward zero with their economies of scale and we knew we were locked in a race against time. Onsite storage costs were also continuously falling so pricing pressure would be sure to emerge. The board didn’t care. It was full speed ahead. Our economics were compelling, but there was a ticking clock as to their competitiveness.
Nirvanix’s Initial Price Matrix
One day early into the next year, a database admin made a coding error. As a young company run by young executives, are processes and safety measures were lacking. 10s of thousands of the legacy consumer accounts from the former company, still very much alive, all got deleted. No restoral measures. This drove and absolute PR nightmare. Bloggers, press went wild claiming that this is why the cloud is unsafe. The company’s future was once again hanging in the balance.
The data loss story was hard to counter, but we all manned the message boards, the phone lines and the journalists. The data that was lost were isolated to the free legacy accounts and did not affect the enterprise side of the business thankfully. We recovered but it took time because the headlines weren’t great.
We employed scrappy, innovative techniques to get positive notoriety. One example is creating a campaign called “The Box is Dead” taking aim at onsite enterprise storage products. Before video was popular in social media, we created a scrappy video of our Facebook developer customer smashing a server in the desert with a sledgehammer. Our in-house Nirvanix band recorded a soundtrack for the piece. Once uploaded to YouTube, we emailed it to press and analysts industry wide to an amazing reception. We went viral before going viral was a thing. With just a very small PR budget we drove huge share of voice in the market up against $100B+ companies around the world. The link to a copy of the video is here.
Example of Press Coverage of our Scrappy Promotional Video
Due to customer growth, new funding on the horizon, and the board’s feeling that the company needed to be matured in the wake of the data loss incident, Patrick hired a Dell heavyweight to come in as CFO. Major Horton was different. Up against the young, aggressive startup team, he was well, Dell. Big company guy. He brought structure to the company for sure but not always in productive ways. For instance, when I came on the company, I requested that I have a MacBook Pro. A Dell guy, Major insisted that, post-facto, I produce a cost-benefit analysis relative to Dell products.
We all got a corporate apartment just outside the Gaslamp District of San Diego in Little Italy. It was sparse with no furniture. Patrick’s EA was sent to buy us all mattresses at the Salvation Army store. We didn’t have frames to put them on so we laid them on the floor. It was designed to be as cheap as possible. This is where Major, Geoff, Edgard and Dan would hole up during work weeks in San Diego.
Major had a big company style and with that came politics. Soon came gaslighting and here say. The core startup team didn’t know how to handle this other than approach Patrick with the concerns. One thing we had as a team from the start was unity, trust and ambition. It seems some of this was starting to unravel and it all pointed back to one organizational manipulator. Major. Major held the cards, however. Patrick had to stand behind him with his board support. So, issues got suppressed but the tone of the organization turned.
The nightlife around the office was vibrant and this team worked hard and played hard, but the focus on the business did not wane.
Things were once again working. The company was maturing with additional senior talent coming on board, new nodes being built out and good deal flow. Here it was mid-2008 and we were on our way.
Funding from big partners like Intel started to close. Still the numbers weren’t big up against the huge players we were up against. Building out worldwide storage nodes for the SDN proved to be very expensive. We had awoken giants to enter the space thanks to our launch and industry press coverage. AWS was accelerating and taking steps to productize their S3 storage platform. We had to remain scrappy, lean and mean.
Then cracks in the seams started showing up in the economy. The stock market was becoming unsteady, the housing market looked to be crashing. A financial market meltdown was in the making. By the third quarter some enterprise deals started to fall, and Major started to panic, maybe rightly so in hindsight. He started to hit the brakes.
In accordance with my contract, I was to move to San Diego by Labor Day at the company’s limited expense and I executed on that plan. The company goal was to cut the travel expenses from the Bay Area and to eliminate the corporate apartment. I found an apartment, painted, bought furniture and everything to outfit my new home dedicated to the success of Nirvanix.
I took a week off of work to gather my things back home, get my affairs in order and to arrange the move to my new apartment. Over the week, Patrick stopped taking any calls, returning text or email. Completely. Major too. Something was up. But I continued and executed on the move.
I showed up to work on the Tuesday after Labor Day to my new office to find it wasn’t functional. Major stepped into my office and asked me to join him in the conference room. In there was the head of HR. Patrick walked in seconds later and shut the door. I was being fired -the day after I moved into my new corporate home. My first thought is that I just painted the apartment, I can’t get out of the lease and what am I going to do with all this new furniture? Patrick kept talking about something that just wasn’t true. There was no performance issue. We had hit the headwall in the economy fast. In hindsight I was the first of all of the original team to go, leaving only Major. The initial deal was that I was to get nothing – no move back money, no relief, nothing. Over the course of the week we settled but it still wasn’t particularly fair. I would stay on for six months with Nirvanix as a client to start my new marketing consulting firm and expenses were reimbursed. My journey with Nirvanix was over.
In starting my new firm shortly thereafter, I began working with Nirvanix’s VP of Business Development for the Entertainment industry, Ezra Davidson. He and I had grown close at Nirvanix before my departure in developing business together in LA. Ezra had brought to the company a young, female associate who turned out to be his mistress as time would reveal. With great irony, on our trips together in LA he would frequently give me marital advice. He was a very gentle soul and a pleasure to work with.
It was that 4th quarter of 2008 that Ezra and his assistant/companion were let go. He and I started developing business together. We had a deal in the pipeline with Quincy Jones, Jr. the son of the famous producer. We had other deals in the funnel too, but this was the most promising. The day after the New Year’s holiday was our next conference call with Quincy Jones, Jr.. I called in on time as did Quincy, but Ezra never showed. I couldn’t reach him on text or phone. We held on for almost 15 minutes but ended the call early.
It was only a week later that I learned of Ezra’s disappearance. My old PR agency had called me to say she read online that Ezra had been shot in the back of the head while sleeping by his wife on New Year’s Eve and she was in custody. Ezra, my Nirvanix friend was dead and his wife, Adriene had murdered him.
Apparently, ten days leading up to his death, Major Horton had sent company expense data to Ezra – but through his wife and not directly to him. It was clear in the documentation that Major was not going to reimburse some expenses that he felt were attributed to his mistress. This was not done without purpose. Ezra’s assistant weeks later told me that the email was no mistake.
This email was how his wife, Adriane, found out about the affair. Adriane, that day, went into a gun store near their home in Pomona, California and put herself on the 10-day waiting period list to buy a brand new Smith and Wesson 45 caliber pistol.
On New Year’s Eve, Adriane’s 10-day waiting period was up and she picked up the gun. After waiting for Ezra to slumber after they polished a champagne bottle together, she shot him in the back of the head, leaving their two children without a father.
The story of Ezra’s killing was widely covered in the press and led to a television episode on the matter. Oxygen Network’s True Crime series produced an episode on the dramatic events entitled, “Snapped – Adriene Davidson” Season 10, Episode 3. Adriene received 25 years to life in prison. The whole ordeal devastated me. Gone was my friend, Nirvanix colleague and now my partner in business. Major continued at Nirvanix for some time before the board let him go too, ending the tenure of any of the early Nivanix team. Major died on March 25, 2021
As the economy continued to falter into 2009, the board pulled in the purse strings further. The company started to layoff more of the team. By the close of the year all of the startup team, including the two founders were eliminated and with that went the passion, the drive and the ambition of the original culture. Left behind was Major Horton to run things with his spreadsheet and a carousel of new team members.
Nirvanix took in a series of CMOs and three more CEOs with new, notable investors between 2010 and 2013. The complete list of investors included now included:
Mission Ventures: Early and continued investor. San Diego-based VC firm focused on early-stage tech
Valhalla Partners: Participated in Series A and subsequent rounds. East Coast VC firm with focus on IT infrastructure
Windward Ventures: Southern California VC firm that backed several early-stage tech startups
Intel Capital: Joined in the December 2007 funding round. Strategic investor supporting cloud infrastructure innovation
European Founders Fund (now Global Founders Capital): Participated in the 2007–2008 funding rounds. Backed several global tech ventures
Khosla Ventures: Led the $25 million Series C round in 2012. Known for bold, high-risk tech bets in cloud and enterprise
Scott Genereux was appointed president and CEO of Nirvanix in November 2010, replacing Jim Zierick who had replace Patrick Harr earlier. Since then, the company overhauled its management team and signed a number of partners, including a 5-year OEM agreement with IBM. Nirvanix has also deployed petabyte-scale clouds at Cerner, USC, and others. In December 2012 Genereux left to join Oracle Corporation, and was replaced by Dru Borden, who was then replaced by Debra Chrapaty in March 2013.
Despite the earlier agreement, IBM acquired SoftLayer in June 2013 and started a competitor, IBM Cloud Services Division.
On September 16, 2013, Nirvanix notified customers that they had until September 30, 2013 to move their data off of the service at which point Nirvanix would shut down. By September 28, 2013, the company deactivated its website and replaced it with a statement that included customer support details. Nirvanix said an IBM team could assist customers with transferring their data from the Nirvanix infrastructure. The company filed for US Chapter 11 bankruptcy on October 1, 2013, which was approved on October 8. Oracle Corporations the proceed to buy the Intellectual Property, assets and engineering resources.
This very high-profile industry shutdown left many asking if the dream of cloud storage as dead. Clearly it was not.
It was April of 2021 when I was watching Jeopardy!, the television game show, when the $1,000 tech Jeopardy! Question came on the screen.
“Customers of Nirvanix, one of these atmospheric storage services, had to scramble when the company closed up shop.” Answer: The Cloud.
Yes, in all of this, with a modest budget and a focused team, at least help give birth to a whole new category of computing.
Building a brand isn’t for the faint of heart. It’s a slow, deliberate process built on trust, consistency, and relentless focus. But what happens when your board doesn’t see it that way? What happens when they demand you grow a brand overnight—and measure you against companies spending 100 times your marketing budget?
This is the story of the toughest board meeting of my career. It was over the topic of branding, and it taught me lessons I’ll carry for the rest of my professional life.
The Setup: A Classic David vs Goliath Market
We were retained to manage the entire marketing function for a company in the booming “big data” space. The market was barely a few years old, but already crowded with multi-billion-dollar competitors. Amazon Web Services, Microsoft, and other tech giants had first-mover advantage and marketing budgets that dwarfed ours.
Our company had just raised a $20 million Series A. No massive war chest. No big media budgets. But we had a clear strategy.
We implemented highly focused messaging and precise demand generation campaigns. We targeted buyer profile — companies that were born in the cloud and highly motivated to compete for top engineering talent. Rather than try to outspend the giants, we carved out a specific space in the market, aligning the company’s message with the worldview of its founders and a very targeted buyer profile.
It worked.
– Analyst firms began to take notice—without us paying the typical “entrance fees.”
– Press coverage grew steadily.
– Customer count rose from 19 to over 100.
– ARR climbed from under $1 million to over $10 million, then leapt toward $100 million.
But despite our success, tensions with the board began to simmer.
The Clash: When Branding Expectations Become Unrealistic
Two issues surfaced that didn’t sit well with investors:
1. Our success was largely with “digital native” companies—born after the dot-com era—not the traditional enterprise giants. An enterprise sales path, the methodologies and the staffing to support it was a great departure from the path that had empirically demonstrated success for the company.
2. In their eyes, our brand wasn’t growing fast enough.
In just 2.5 quarters, they expected us to stand shoulder to shoulder with Amazon and Microsoft in the enterprise space. It didn’t seem to matter that their marketing budgets were 100x ours. Would “building a brand” inorganically even move the needle if the goal is really to shift to Enterprise sales? Is this the best thing to do if we are going to pivot? Or is it a rabbit hole distraction?
That’s when I was called to a special board meeting—one focused entirely on marketing.
The conversation turned heated. The prevailing view seemed to be that brand building was simply a matter of spending more and expecting faster results. I reminded them:
“A brand is not built on noise; it’s built on trust. Money accelerates brand awareness, but trust is earned over time.”
And then it happened.
An influential board member stopped the room cold and said something I’ll never forget:
“You need to take lessons from ISIS. Look how quickly they cemented their name in all our heads!”
We sat in stunned silence. In that moment, it was painfully clear—this was a fundamental misalignment of values and philosophy.
The Aftermath: When Strategy Meets Reality
Back at work, we doubled down on business fundamentals and continued to grow.
To support a move into the enterprise space, I hired a data analyst to build an AI model that ranked the top 5,000 corporations in North America by data maturity. Our analysis identified just 423 companies realistically capable of buying our product.
Unfortunately, those were the exact targets our competitors had locked onto—and they had the firepower to outgun us. Meanwhile, AWS began developing a competitive offering aimed directly at our market.
I initiated backchannel discussions with a major competitor who saw strategic value in acquiring us. They were reportedly considering an acquisition at a 20x multiple of our raised capital.
But when the offer was quietly floated, the CEO reportedly dismissed it outright, saying:
“Why would you want to be here if it’s not to build a public company?”
I prepared a final strategic analysis, mapping out the likely moves of all major industry players using game theory. The conclusion was clear: Without a partnership or acquisition, the company would face insurmountable odds.
I sent my final recommendation, respectfully warning that we didn’t believe this was a viable path to an IPO or a major exit.
The CEO’s response?
“It’s not the CMO’s business to advise on company direction. And by the way, the board still doesn’t believe you built the brand fast enough.”
The next day, we submitted our 30-day termination notice.
The Epilogue: And Then, the Endgame
The company went on to raise another $60 million over the next several years. Four years and 11 months after I submitted that final strategy memo, the company was acquired—reportedly for $77 million, plus debt.
Less than the $100 million threshold I had warned about.
Lessons I’ll Never Forget
1. Ensure Marketing Has a Seat at the Strategic Table.
Marketing isn’t just tactical execution—it’s fundamental to business strategy. If leadership doesn’t see that, your impact will always be limited.
2. Interview the Board Before You Say Yes.
Understand their expectations and alignment before you take the job. Their goals may not be purely about shareholder value.
3. Trust the Math, Not the Myth.
Emotion and ego are dangerous drivers. Data and disciplined strategy should win the day.
4. Never Look a Gift Horse in the Mouth.
Sometimes the best deal is the one right in front of you. Not every company is destined to IPO glory.
Would I make the same decision again? Absolutely. I’ll take a hard-earned lesson over a soft landing any day.
Why You Must Develop a Sales & Marketing MVP Alongside Your Product MVP to Lower Risk 🚀
Only 1 in 10 B2B Tech Startups Survive to See Series C
And it’s not for lack of great ideas or talented founders. It’s because most startups launch under a flawed assumption: “If we build it, they will come.” But they don’t. And they won’t—unless you deliberately engineer a parallel path to product-market fit through your go-to-market strategy.
Why Brilliant Products Fail
From Google Glass to the Segway and Amazon’s Fire Phone, even well-funded innovations have crashed because they failed to answer the most important question of all: What job is the product actually hired to do?
As taught by the late Professor Clayton Christensen in The Innovator’s Dilemma, customers don’t just buy products—they “hire” them to solve specific problems. If you haven’t validated what real problem your product solves, you’re rolling the dice with your future. At The Artesian Network, we’ve helped dozens of startups navigate this perilous phase. In fact, over 50% of our client base has gone on to achieve successful exits through IPO or acquisition—vastly higher than industry averages—because we focus relentlessly on building a Sales & Marketing MVP alongside the Product MVP.
The Sales & Marketing MVP: A Learning Process, Not a Launch
Instead of hiring a VP of Sales and scaling a full sales team, smart founders start small and focused: – 2–3 entrepreneurial sales reps who thrive in ambiguity – 1 marketing generalist to test messages and gather market feedback – A fractional strategist to guide positioning, pricing, and early market entry This team isn’t about revenue yet—it’s about learning.
Visualizing the Sales & Marketing Learning Curve (SMLC)
Like product development, your go-to-market approach must iterate toward efficiency. Productivity starts low, but as messaging sharpens and objections are understood, conversion rates improve. Premature scaling before this learning curve flattens leads directly to burnouts and failures.
Recommended Benchmarks Before Scaling
Before pouring fuel on the fire, ensure you’re hitting these conversion metrics:
Resist the Urge to Scale Too Soon
– Are your customer acquisition costs within range? – Is your sales cycle predictable? – Do you know which customer segments convert—and why? – Can you clearly articulate ROI to the buyer? If the answer to any of these is ‘no,’ keep testing before you scale.
Final Thought: Think Like a Scientist, Not a Seller
The startups that survive—and thrive—approach go-to-market as a discovery process. They don’t bet the company on assumptions; they experiment, validate, and then scale. That’s how you build it. That’s how you prove it. And that’s how you win.